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Attorney Fees as Superfund Response Costs
K.K. DuVivier & Carolyn L. Buchholz
Although other areas of natural resources law have been hit by hard times, the
environ mental area is burgeoning. The intricacies of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA or Super fund),
as amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA),
ensure attorney participation. Furthermore, much of the fuel that drives CERCLA
litigation is the presumption by many clients that their attorney fees are costs that can
be recovered as response costs under section 107 of CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9607
(1983). Such an assumption may be a serious and costly mistake.
It is well established that the federal government can recover its attorney fees as
response costs. This conclusion is based upon section 104(b)(l) of CERCLA which
provides that "the President may undertake such planning, legal, fiscal, economic,
engineering, architectural, and other studies or investigations as he may deem
necessary or appropriate to plant and direct response actions, to recover the costs
thereof, and to enforce the provisions of this chapter." 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b)(l)
(1988) (emphasis added).
In a case decided before enactment of SARA the United States District Court for
the Western District of Missouri imposed liability for all of the federal
government's litigation costs, in eluding attorney fees. United States v. North
eastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co. (NEPACCO), 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D.
Mo. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 810 F.2d 726 (8th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). In determining that CERCI.A
specifically allows the federal government to recover attorney fees, the NEPACCO
court first examined section 107(a)(4)(A) and the definition of "remove" or
"removal" under section 101(23). The connection to the language in section
104 (b) addressing "legal" costs was established only through a reference to section
104(b) in the definition for "remove" and "removal" in section 101 (23). Id. at
851-52.
In addition to costs incurred by "the United States Government," section
107(a)(l)-(4)(A) of CERCI.A provides for recovery of "all costs of removal or
remedial action incurred by . . . a State.... " 42U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)(4)(A)(1988). Furthermore, the scope of the term "state" as used in CERCI.A has
been interpreted to include municipalities and local governments. See, e.g., Mayor
of Boontoon v. Drew Chemical Corp., 621 F. Supp. 633, 667 (D.N.J. 1985).
Confusion arising from the distinction be tween the clause relating to recovery
(section 107) and the separate clause relating to enforcement (section 104)
prompted the following SARA revision of section 101(25) of CERCI.A: "[t]he terms
'respond' or 'response' mean re move, removal, remedy, and remedial action, all
such terms (including the terms 'removal' and 'remedial action') include enforcement
activities related thereto." 42 U.S.C.§9601 (25) (1988) (emphasis added to
highlight language of amendment). In discussing this amendment, the House report
on the 1986 SARA amendments states that "section 101 (25) also modifies the
definition of 'response action' to include related enforcement activities. The change
confirms the EPA's authority to recover costs for enforcement actions against
responsible parties." H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 1, at 66-67

(1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2848-49
(emphasis added). Thus, any question of whether government attorney fees are
recover able as response costs has been answered in the affirmative.
In contrast, from 1988 through 1990, federal district courts in Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, and Massachusetts have
determined that the language of CERCI.A does not support the recovery of private party
attorney fees as response costs. In addition to the reasoning above, perhaps one of the
strongest arguments against imputing such intent to Congress is the lack in CERCIA of
specific, straightforward language addressing an award of attorney fees to a
private party. "If Congress had intended to permit citizens seeking response costs to
recover their attorney fees, it would simply have amended 107 to allow the recovery
of these litigation costs. SARA was a comprehensive overhaul of CERCLA.
Therefore, it would have been a simply [sic] matter to amend § 107 to allow recovery
of attorney fees." Regan v. Cherry Corp., 706 F. Supp. 145, 149 (D.R.I. 1989).
There is a split among the districts, how ever. Federal district courts in New York and
California have examined the issue and deter mined that attorney fees are recoverable in a
private party CERCIA action. Probably the most explicit and extensive reasoning for this
out come is set forth in Pease & Curren Refining, Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945
(C.D. Cal. 1990). In Pease, the court based its conclusion on two rationales: (1) the
meaning of the section 101 (25) SARA amendment, and (2) the legislative purpose of
CERCIA.
With respect to the first rationale, the Pease court concluded that Congress intended
the plain meaning of " 'enforcement activities' to include attorney's fees expended to
induce a responsible party to comply with the remedial actions mandated by CERCLA.
If this court were to rule otherwise, the phrase 'enforcement activities' would be
superfluous." Id. at 951.
When viewed at face value, this conclusion is rather simplistic; it improperly
overlooks the significant distinctions between government and private litigants. There are
specific government costs of enforcement that could not be incurred by a private party.
These costs may include ad ministrative investigations, public health and safety
determinations, selections of cleanup standards, and administrative enforcement
proceedings.
Congress understood these differences, providing two separate response cost
recovery sections, one for government entities (section 107(a)(l)-(4)(A)) and one for
private parties (section 107(a)(l)-(4)(B)). The Ninth Circuit has stated, "The word 'other'
in section 107(a)(2)(B) reasonably functions to distinguish between government
response costs in subsection (A) and private response costs in subsection (B)." Wickland
Oil Terminals v. ASARCO, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 891 (9th Cir.1986).
In examining the second rationale (the express language of the House report
concerning addition of the term "enforcement activities" into the definition for
"response"), the Pease court's logic appears further strained and circuitous. First, the
court notes that "Congress has not expressly limited the definitions set forth in§ 101 (25)
to federal parties." Pease, 744 F. Supp. at 951. Then, the court concludes, based simply
on the premise that the general definition of "response" can apply to both federal and
private parties, that Congress intended it to have the same meaning in both federal and
private contexts.

The bounds of logic are extenuated when a change in the general definition section (§
101), which the House report explicitly states was directed at the government
response-cost provisions (§§ 104 and 107(a)(l)-(4)(A)), is interpreted as a de
liberate effort on the part of Congress to change the impact of the private response-cost
section (§ 107(a)(l)-(4)(B)). This is especially true when "enforcement activities" have
no specific meaning in the private context.
Moreover, to suggest that the term "enforcement costs" encompasses only attorney
fees would render use of the express term ''legal'' in section 104(b)(l) superfluous
because that section also addresses enforcement separately. Additionally, the Pease
court's argument does not explain why explicit terms such as "legal" or "litigation"
costs were not added to the private party sections through the comprehensive SARA
amendments.
Finally, the Pease court's reasoning is in consistent with general rules of
statutory construction when it found that in adding the term "enforcement activities,"
Congress specifically intended that such term be interpreted as attorney fees and also
specifically intended it to be applied in both the government and private contexts.
Such reasoning flies in the face of other language the Pease court uses to describe
CERCIA: "CERCIA is not a paradigm of clarity or precision. It has been criticized
frequently for unartful drafting and numerous ambiguities...."Pease, 744 F. Supp. at
950 (quoting Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 851 F.2d
643, 648 (3rd Cir.1988)).
With respect to this legislative purpose rationale, the Pease court reasoned CERCIA
is a "remedial" statute designed " 'to ensure the prompt and effective cleanup of waste
disposal sites, and to assure that parties responsible for hazardous substances bore the
cost of remedying the conditions they created'
Allowing a private party to recover
attorney's fees is consistent with this purpose." Id. at 951 (quoting Mardan Corp. v.
C.G.C. Music, LTD., 804 F.2d 1454, 1455 (9th Cir. 1986)).
It is true that permitting parties to recover attorney fees would promote litigation
under CERCLA. However, there is not necessarily a direct correlation between the
promotion of CERCLA litigation and "prompt and effective cleanup" of sites affected
by the release of hazardous substances. In fact, the contrary may be true. If multiparty
defendants realized that they might be responsible for their own attorney fees, protracted
litigation might be replaced with more speedy and efficient settlements.
Regardless of the court's rationale for denying Spectrolab's motion to dismiss Pease
& Curren 'sprayer for attorney fees, it is significant to note that the Pease decision cannot
be cited as an unrestricted endorsement for attorney fee awards in private party
CERCLA cases. In the penultimate paragraph of the Pease decision, the court addresses
the argument that "garden variety tort claims" could be masked "as CERCLA claims in
order to recover attorney's fees." Id. at 952. The court responds that al lowing the
recovery of attorney fees under CERCLA does not automatically allow the recovery of
all attorney fees a party has incurred in pursuing the action. "[T)he amount of attorney's
fees that [a party] might be awarded would be an issue to be determined on an allocation
basis at a later time." Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, even when attorney fees are to be
awarded, a strict response-cost accounting is required.
Although federal district courts across the country have wrestled with this attorney
fees issue, it has been addressed by the circuit courts in only one case. The Eighth Circuit

determined that General Electric could recover S419,000 in attorney fees as response
costs in General Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial Automation Systems, Inc. (GE), 920
F.2d 14 I 5 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3652 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1991).
The Eighth Circuit's attorney fees analysis is a meager paragraph with a footnote
describing the split of authority on the issue and citing nine of the relevant federal
district court cases. The decision is grounded almost exclusively on policy-the remedial
purpose of CERCLA.
In denying certiorari in the GE case, the U.S. Supreme Court may have intended to
endorse the Eighth Circuit's conclusion. On the other hand, the Court simply may have
accepted the argument made by GE that Supreme Court review is unnecessary if only
one circuit has ruled on the issue. In either case, the attorney fees issue remains
unresolved.
In sum, no court has yet clearly established the bright line dividing actions in which
private party attorney fees may be recovered from those in which they may not.
However, the answer may lie in a closer focus on the actual "enforcement activities"
language used by Congress in the SARA amendment to section 101 (2) of CERCIA. It
is overly inclusive to conclude that all private party litigation constitutes "enforcement
activities," and therefore, that all private party attorney fees are recoverable.
On the other hand, when a private party is litigating under CERCIA to secure
cleanup or for cost recovery following cleanup, that litigation may properly be
characterized as an enforcement activity. Awarding attorney fees in such cases promotes
"two of the main purposes of CERCLA-prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites and
imposition of all cleanup costs on the responsible party." General Electric, 920 F.2d at
1422. Such an award can be defended on the basis of policy if not on the basis of strict
statutory analysis.
Although a definitive answer to the private attorney fees issue does not yet exist, in
light of the significance of the response-costs question, it is certain that many more
courts will opine before the matter is resolved. Until the courts render a definitive
answer to the private attorney fees issue the specter of nonrecovery looms.
Consequently, private party litigants should be advised of the risk that an award of
attorney fees is not universally ensured. However, the likelihood of recovery may be
enhanced if private party actions can be characterized as enforcement activities. Cost
documentation will remain a critical aspect of case preparation and counsel
representation until this recovery issue is resolved. Specific, itemized cost
documentation that demonstrates the enforcement nature of the activities engaged in
will maximize the private party litigant's chances of success fully recovering its
attorney fees as a response cost.

